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Abstract 
 
Agricultural biotechnology in general and “genetically modified organisms” in particular present, depending on 
whom you believe, either great opportunities for – or threats to – the future of farming and of food security in 
Southeast Asia. As a reflection of this cognitive rift, countries in the region have adopted divergent policies on 
genetically modified crops. Although both countries strove to become biotech pioneers in the 1990s, today the 
Philippines has emerged as regional leader in this second Green Revolution whereas Thailand effectively has 
rejected the new technology. Why have proponents of applied agricultural biotechnology succeeded in making 
the cultivation of biotech crops politically acceptable in the Philippines but failed in Thailand?  
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“The government won’t let the country miss the biotechnology train.”  
– Thaksin Shinawatra (2004) 
 
“There is great objection to this [technology] from the civil society. So the Philippines will 
not be initiating or pushing for this experimentation [on genetically-modified crops].” 
– Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001) 
 
In The windup girl, an award-winning science fiction novel set in 23rd-century Thailand, 
multinational corporations control the world’s food supply, and superweeds and food-borne 
diseases plague mankind. Thailand is the sole remaining national bastion of resistance, 
retaining a modicum of sovereign control over its genetic resources and thus thwarting the 
monopolistic ambitions of imperialistic “calorie corporations,” for which intellectual property 
rights over genetic resources serve as an instrument of global domination (Bacigalupi 2010).  
If there is an element of truth in the conceit of this biopunk science fiction novel, it is 
that recent Thai governments, contrary to what the quote from Thailand’s then-Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra above might suggest, in comparison with its regional peers have 
been exceptionally hesitant when it comes to embracing the biotechnological revolution, 
partly out of fear of domination by foreign “calorie corporations” (see table 1). The 
Philippines, similarly contrary to what the quote from then-President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo above might suggest, is Southeast Asia’s undisputed agro-biotech leader, with an 
estimated 800,000 hectares of genetically modified (GM) maize under commercial 
cultivation.1   
 
1 It is followed by Burma/Myanmar which is growing an estimated 300,000 hectares of GM cotton (James 
2014; Oo 2010). Indonesia and Vietnam have more recently jumped on the biotech bandwagon, with the former 
country having approved drought-resistant GM sugarcane for commercial cultivation, and the latter giving the 
green light to cultivation of GM maize (Waltz 2014; Thanh Nien News 2015). While Malaysia has yet to 
commercialize any GM crop, it approved confined field trials on delayed-ripening GM papaya in 2013 (Wahab 
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Laboratory & greenhouse Field trial Commercialization 
Thailand Malaysia Philippines 
  Burma/Myanmar 
  Indonesia 
  Vietnam 
 
Table 1. Stage of development of GM crops in major agricultural economies in 
Southeast Asia, 2015 
 
The objective of this article is to shed light on the politics surrounding the incorporation – or 
exclusion – of modern agricultural biotechnology in national models of rural development in 
Southeast Asia.2 It does so through a comparative study of Thailand and the Philippines, as 
they effectively represent the extreme ends of the regional spectrum.3 Their sharply 
contrasting positions with regards to GM crops also present something of a puzzle, because 
the two countries were in fact at a similar stage in the development of GM crops as recently 
as 2001, when both had approved and conducted open field trials. Since then, the Philippine 
state has taken a step forward, to commercialization, by allowing maize farmers to plant GM 
seeds sold by Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-Bred, and Syngenta. The Thai state, on the other hand, 
has taken several steps backwards, by instructing Thai plant scientists working on GM crops 
                                                                                                                                                  
2014). Although unrelated to agriculture, the Malaysian government in 2010 released genetically engineered 
mosquitos in order to evaluate their potential as a means by which to combat dengue fever. 
2 In this article, modern agricultural biotechnology refers to techniques associated with genetic engineering 
and thus to crops that are classified as genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It does not include more 
“traditional” biotechnological applications to plant science, such as tissue culture. 
3 Thailand is of course not alone in Southeast Asia in abstaining from making a serious push into GM 
farming. One might also point to Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Singapore. But Cambodia and Laos largely lack 
the scientific resources for any serious biotech push, and Brunei and Singapore have miniscule agricultural 
sectors. Thailand, in contrast, enjoys both the scientific capabilities – not least the human resources – and a 
sufficiently large and advanced agricultural sector that it could, if it so desired, become a regional and perhaps 
global leader in the adoption and development of modern agricultural biotechnology. 
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to return to their greenhouses and laboratories, where they remain confined today. How can 
we explain these divergent biotechnological trajectories? 
Seeking to answer that question is substantively worthwhile, as divergent national 
policies with regard to GMOs are likely to critically shape the agricultural and economic 
futures of Southeast Asian nations. While there is no room in this paper to properly assess 
and quantify such impacts, the Philippine-Thai divergence in maize production since GM 
seeds were approved for commercial cultivation in the Philippines (in December 2002) is 
suggestive of the potential economic implications of GMO-related policy choices (see figure 
1). The number of Philippine farmers growing GM maize had by 2011 topped 300,000, and 
farm incomes had been raised, according to one estimate, by a total of US$378.3 million 
between 2003 and 2012 (Brookes 2014: 11). Furthermore, the fact that the Philippines has 
emerged as an exporter of maize is a feather in the cap for a state committed to achieving 
national “sufficiency” (Aguiba 2013). In Thailand, on the other hand, a serious tension 
between official policy and the “everyday” political economy of at least one GM crop has 
arisen, as farmers seek prosperity in what Ronald Herring with reference to India and Brazil 
has described as “an anarchic agrarian capitalism that defies surveillance and control of firms 
and states” (Herring 2007: 130). Some of the best evidence for significant illicit cultivation of 
GM crops by Thai farmers comes from Europe. Thailand alone accounts for 25 percent of the 
notifications of unauthorized GM food or feed in imports into the EU during the three-year 
period from 1 January 2012 to 1 January 2015, and in all instances GM papaya was the 
culprit.4 Thus, Thailand and the Philippines do not just differ in their GMO-related policy 
choices. As a consequence of those choices, they also differ in the degree to which they have 
been able to respond to new technological developments in such a way that farmers seeking 
 
4 Data from RASFF portal (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/rasff-window/portal/), accessed on 15 April 2015.  
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to boost the productivity of their farms make crop choices that align with official 
development ambitions and comply with government regulations.5 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Maize production in the Philippines and Thailand, 1983-2013 
Source: FAOSTAT (http://faostat3.fao.org) 
 
In this essay I argue that a number of commonly invoked cultural, economic, and institutional 
variables fail to properly account for GMO policy divergence in Thailand and the 
Philippines, and that its historical and political origins are to be found in the different degrees 
to which the Asian financial crisis of 1997 caused transformations in the political and 
 
5 The paper is based on the assumption that the application of modern agricultural biotechnology has the 
potential to increase the productivity of farmers, but recognizes that it will not necessarily do so. Whether it 
does in any particular instance depends on the specifics of the genetic modification, local agronomic conditions, 
and other many other factors. 
GM 
commercialization 
approved in the 
Philippines 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 1983 
 1988 
 1993 
 1998 
 2003 
 2008 
 2013 
M
ill
io
n 
to
nn
es
 
Philippines Thailand 
 6 
ideological landscapes in the two countries. In short, the Asian financial crisis paved the way 
for mobilization and empowerment of opponents of agricultural biotechnology in Thailand, 
but not, or much less so, in the Philippines. In Thailand the crisis produced a gradually 
increasing level of inconsistency between policies and initiatives promoting the development 
and adoption of complicated “foreign” technologies such as GM crops and an ascending 
developmental paradigm – sufficiency economy – which viewed “globalization” as a 
dangerous thing which the Thai state could not be trusted to manage well. It is therefore little 
wonder that Prime Minister Thaksin stumbled when he tried to jump on the biotech train. In 
the Philippines, in contrast, the crisis if anything further strengthened the tight coupling 
between regnant developmental ideas – a market- and technology-driven model of rural 
development focused on boosting productivity – and a liberal regulatory framework 
governing research and development on, and eventually commercialization of, GM crops. 
This is, ultimately, why President Macapagal-Arroyo failed in her brief attempt to reverse 
course on GMOs. In analytical terms we may think of the divergent paths of the two 
countries as critically shaped by variation in the extent of “friction” between ideas and 
institutions that emerged in the wake of the financial crisis (Lieberman 2002). 
The essay is divided into two main sections. I begin by discussing alternative 
explanations for why some countries adopt GM crops and others do not, and outlining an 
explanatory framework centered on the impact of the Asian financial crisis and its 
implications for groups seeking to promote or oppose GM crops. I then present a brief history 
of political contestation over agri-biotech-relevant policies and initiatives in the two 
countries. This serves three related analytical purposes. First, to establish that the two 
countries’ biotech trajectories prior to 1998 were, indeed, comparable and that they diverged 
only after the crisis. Second, to identify the precise moments, in the aftermath of the crisis, 
when the direction of travel with regards to agricultural biotechnology diverged. Third, to 
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show how the two countries have become locked into their separate biotech paths in the years 
since the initial parting, in spite of serious efforts to reverse course (i.e., reviving biotech 
ambitions in Thailand, halting them in the Philippines). In the latter two sections, particular 
attention is paid to the political dynamics at work in episodes of political contention over the 
future of GM crops, with a particular focus on the ideological context. Thus, although the 
Asian financial crisis had nothing directly to do with agricultural biotechnology, I argue that 
it has played a surprisingly important role both in shaping the political arena in which 
struggles over GM crops take place and in determining the outcomes of those struggles. 
 
Explaining the biotech divide  
Scholars have identified a number of variables that influence the likelihood that a country 
will adopt (or reject) GM crops. Cultural differences provide one possible source of policy 
divergence. Not the least in popular debates, culturally distinct attitudes to foods are 
frequently invoked in order to explain why some countries (such as the United States) have 
embraced agricultural biotechnology whereas others (such as the European Union and Japan) 
have been more wary of this form of agricultural innovation. The problem with an argument 
centered on differences in deep-seated national values is that these for analytical purposes 
must be considered constants, whereas GMO policies even in places like Europe and Japan 
have varied considerably over time (Sato 2015). This is true also for Southeast Asia, and this 
undermines any argument along the lines that GMOs are more amenable to incorporation into 
the moral and cultural fabric of the Philippines than that of Thailand. In addition, the 
dominant cultural and moral tradition in the Philippines – Roman Catholicism – is generally 
perceived to be rather less hospitable to GM technologies, including but not limited to 
agricultural applications, than the eclectic Hindu-Buddhist cultural paradigm found in 
Thailand (Silver 2007; Fox 2007; Brunk and Coward 2009). In the Philippines, the portrayal 
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of genetic modification as an act of hubris (“playing God”) and “unnatural” has significant 
religious resonance.  In Thailand, in contrast, the Theravada Buddhist cultural paradigm 
provides more limited scope for such religiously inspired stigmatization of biotech science, 
given the absence in canonical Buddhist texts of a creator god and notions of nature (Harris 
1991).6 It is therefore not entirely surprising that, whereas the Catholic Church in the 
Philippines has “largely expressed apprehension about genetic modification” because of its 
“potentially deleterious impact on the environment, farmers’ socio-economic well-being, and 
moral and ethical issues” (Cabanilla 2007), the Thai equivalent of the church, the Buddhist 
sangha (monastic order), has not, as far as is known, put its opinion on GMOs on the record. 
A culturally essentialist explanation for biotech divergence (which regards culture as static), 
cannot easily explain the observed biotech divergence given that (1) Thai policy has changed 
over time and (2) the positions of religious authorities in both countries push in the “wrong” 
direction. 
This does not mean that culture does not matter. But to the extent that it does, it is not 
because culture is “a unified system that pushes action in a consistent direction” – for or 
against GMOs, for example – but rather because it provides a “‘toolkit’ for constructing 
‘strategies of action’” (Swidler 1986, 277). Thus, the role of cultural factors in contestation 
over GM crops should not be dismissed. As will become clear, the GMO wars in Southeast 
Asia as elsewhere have been fought, in very large part, on shifting and conflicting ideological 
and discursive battlegrounds (Andrée 2007; Sato 2013), by a wide range of political and 
social actors, including religious ones. 
Material interests provide another possible source of policy divergence. It has, for 
example, been highlighted that close trade relations with the European Union appear to affect 
the acceptance of GM crops negatively in developing countries, while close trade ties with 
 
6 Biotechnological innovation and adoption might, however, be blamed for being driven by “greed.” But the 
Buddhist emphasis on intentionality does not single out GMOs as morally more problematic than any other 
technological innovations.. 
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the United States have been associated with the opposite effect (Paarlberg 2001; Clapp 2006). 
The degree to which the Philippines and Thailand are dependent on exports to the United 
States and the European Union are therefore salient factors, and a significant share of both 
countries’ exports are indeed destined to these markets. The patterns of trade do not, 
however, provide any clear incentives for these countries to tack towards either an American 
or a European approach to biotechnology policy. While both countries were more dependent 
on exports to the United States than to the European Union in 2001, the US lead was 
relatively small, although less so in the Philippines than in Thailand. It is also noteworthy that 
the Philippines was more dependent on exports to both the United States and the European 
Union than was the case for Thailand (see table 2). Thus, in the early years of this century, it 
was by no means self-evident that strategic trade interests would be best served by Thailand 
choosing (as it did) to reverse course, and the Philippines choosing (as it did) to push ahead 
with cultivation of GM crops. 
Neither can geopolitical positioning easily account for the biotech divergence. As the 
United States is a major supporter of agricultural biotechnology, it is possible that countries 
whose strategic and security interests are more closely intertwined with those of the United 
States may also be more inclined to adopt a US-style position on GMOs. While there are 
important differences in the US relationships with the Philippines (a former US colony) and 
Thailand, the fundamental similarities in terms of strategic positioning in recent decades are 
striking. During the Cold War, the Philippines and Thailand chose to align themselves tightly 
with the United States, and both countries hosted US military bases. It is also noteworthy that 
US President George W Bush designated both countries as major non-NATO allies in 2003, 
and that both the Philippines and Thailand joined the multi-national force in Iraq (Ciorciari 
2010: 117-120). The United States has also given support to the governments of both 
countries in their respective conflicts with Islamic separatist movements. Here one may also 
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note that although the US government has, indeed, made a concerted effort to push for 
agricultural biotechnology in both Thailand and the Philippines, its main priority has been to 
gain market access for US-based producers of GM crops. That has been secured in both 
Thailand and the Philippines.7 
It is also possible that domestic interest groups may shape the policy choices made by 
politicians. Undoubtedly, there are some interest groups that benefit from the adoption of GM 
crops, and others that regard it as a threat. For both the Philippines and Thailand, significant 
economic interests are most likely to have been at stake with regards to the three main GM 
crops that have been commercialized globally, namely maize, soybeans, and cotton. In 2000, 
both countries were producing maize in meaningful quantities. The Philippines was an 
insignificant producer of cotton and soybeans, whereas these crops played a greater but still 
marginal role in Thai agriculture (see table 2).  
 
 Exports  
(% share)a 
Crop production  
(tonnes)b 
Organic agriculturec 
 USA EU15 Maize Cotton Soybean Hectares Share of total agri. 
area (%) 
Philippines 28.0 19.3 4,511,104 1,114 953 14,134 0.12 
Thailand 20.3 16.2 4,472,903 34,275 312,432 21,701 0.11 
Table 2. Economic factors relevant to the politics of agricultural biotechnology 
Sources: a) Export figures are for 2001 and from the International Trade Centre, 
http://www.trademap.org/tradestat/Bilateral_TS.aspx. b) Crop production figures are for 2001 
and from FAOSTAT (http://faostat3.fao.org). c) Data refers to 2005 and from FiBL & 
IFOAM (2014), Data on organic agriculture 2005-2012. The Organic-World.net website 
maintained by the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture (FiBL), Frick, Switzerland. 
Available at http://www.organic-world.net/statistics-data-tables-dynamic.html. 
 
7 GM crops are thus consumed in both Thailand and the Philippines, but approved for production only in the 
Philippines. 
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In light of this it seems reasonable to assume that Thai farmers would have been more 
exposed to the challenges posed by global competition than their Philippine counterparts – 
and as such they would have had a greater incentive to adopt productivity-enhancing 
technologies. This difference in material interests and incentives are further reinforced by the 
fact that the governments of the two countries have adopted very different policy postures 
towards maize producers in one critical respect. Whereas governments in Manila have 
protected them from international competition, governments in Bangkok have generally not. 
The nominal rate of protection for maize in the Philippines has risen steadily since the 1970s 
and reached “nearly 80 percent in the late 1990s” (David, Intal, and Balisacan 2009: 245). In 
contrast, the nominal rate of protection for maize in Thailand has hovered around zero in the 
period from 1968 to 2005 (Warr and Kohpaiboon 2009: 263). Arguably, Thai maize farmers 
would therefore have faced greater pressures than their more sheltered Philippine 
counterparts to adopt GM crops.8  
Some producer groups may also have an interest in opposing GM crops, and it has 
been shown that European countries with a significant organic-farming sector have tended to 
adopt more hostile policies towards GM crops than countries where organic farming plays a 
more marginal role (Kurzer and Cooper 2007). In both the Philippines and Thailand, 
however, the raw economic power of the organic-farming sector is minimal indeed, with 
organic farming covering just a little more than one tenth of one percent of the total 
agricultural area of these countries in 2005 (see table 2). Thus, differences in the strength of 
organic farming in the Philippines and Thailand are unlikely to explain divergent policy 
outcomes with respect to GM crops.  
 
8 Papaya, GM varieties of which as mentioned earlier are grown surreptitiously in Thailand, is not a major 
commercial crop. 
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Apart from material interests, institutional factors – such as the nature of the state, 
regime type, and political parties – may play an important role in shaping outcomes. With 
this in mind it is worth noting that scholars of state-led economic development regard neither 
the Philippine nor the Thai state as “developmental” in the East Asian sense (Booth 1999; 
Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005). However, the Thai state is generally regarded as stronger 
and more coherent than the Philippine state (Larsson 2013; Raquiza 2013), and it has often 
been regarded as more capable of promoting agricultural growth and expansion (Akiyama 
and Larson 2004; Doner 2009: chapter 5). Indeed, the Philippine state has even been labeled 
“anti-development” (Bello et al. 2005). As far as state capacity is concerned, one would 
therefore expect Thailand to be somewhat better positioned than the Philippines to promote 
modern agricultural biotechnology. 
In the period under scrutiny here, the Philippines and Thailand would, for the most 
part, be considered among the region’s more open and democratic regimes (Bertrand 2013). 
In both countries the political systems have provided extensive opportunities for advocates 
and opponents of agricultural biotechnology in civil society and business to influence public 
debate and the political agenda. This is in contrast with the more authoritarian states in 
Southeast Asia, such as Burma/Myanmar and Vietnam, where opportunities for civil society 
to mobilize against GM policy have been minimal. For the Thai case, however, we have 
some significant variation in political institutions, not least thanks to military coups in 
September 2006 and May 2014. However, as we shall see, these take place after the two 
countries have already diverged with regards to GM policy, and thus cannot explain the 
divergence. 
Political parties are another potentially salient institutional factor. In studies of GM 
politics in Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, it has been observed that “the ideological 
composition of governments matters in explaining the regulation of agricultural 
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biotechnology” (Tosun 2014: 362). More precisely, coalition governments in which a 
Christian Democratic party or an Agrarian party participated in government were more likely 
to ban the cultivation of GM crops. Here we may therefore note that the party systems of the 
Philippines and Thailand do not reflect such fundamental ideological or socio-economic 
cleavages. Political parties in these two countries tend to be clientelist and populist rather 
than programmatic (Ufen 2012; Hicken 2009; Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2011). There are no 
major political parties in either country that could be considered Agrarian (or, indeed, Green); 
however, some leading political parties in the Philippines may be described as Christian 
Democratic. In addition, following the passing of the 1995 Party-List Act, some minor 
political parties that may be regarded as Agrarian have successfully stood for election to the 
House of Representatives of the Philippines. Examples include Butil Farmers Party, 
Anakpawis, and ABA (Alyansang Bayanihan Ng Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at 
Mangingisda, Cooperative Alliance of Farmers, Agricultural Workers and Fishermen). 
Anakpawis respresents the Peasant Movement of the Philippines (KMP, Kilusang 
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas), which is a leading anti-GMO group. Through the party-list 
system, an assortment of NGOs and social movements has thus found representation in the 
legislature, where they on occasion have been able to build coalitions broad enough to 
succeed in enacting “socially progressive” laws (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 267), among 
which some might count the Organic Agriculture Act of 2010. Thus, while differences in the 
shape of party systems and coalition governments are unlikely to play a critical role, taking 
this factor into account would lead to the expectation that the Philippines would be somewhat 
less likely than Thailand to adopt GM crops (which is contrary to the observed outcome). 
All in all, a consideration of these cultural, material, and institutional variables does 
not seem to offer any immediately compelling explanation for Philippine-Thai divergence. 
This should not come as a complete surprise: “There is no robust or parsimonious 
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explanation for why some countries accept agricultural biotechnology with little contention, 
whereas others change positions over time or reject the technology altogether” (Herring 
2014: 2). As a consequence, a less parsimonious approach that is sensitive to the historical 
and political context is called for. 
 
Historic blocks, crises, and ideas 
The approach taken in the remained of the paper is centered on two main ideas. The first is 
that policy outcomes with regards to GM crops can be viewed as the products of wars of 
position between rival social forces, reflecting in particular the triumphs and tribulations of 
the “biotech block” (Andrée 2007), which here refers to the alliances of social groups that 
seek to promote research, development, and commercial adoption of agricultural 
biotechnology, and especially GM crops, in Southeast Asia. These groups generally justify 
their commitment in this regard with reference to the technology’s potential to alleviate 
poverty, ensure food security, and improve public health. These are, of course, serious 
challenges in a region experiencing population growth and the effects of climate change. As 
with Gramsci’s notion of a “historic block,” the biotech block in Southeast Asia brings 
together elements of civil society, commercial interests, and (parts of) the state; and it does so 
at both national and international levels (Cox 1983). Amongst the leading members of the 
biotech block in the Philippines and Thailand we find multinational seed corporations, 
Philippine and Thai plant scientists in public universities and research institutes, state 
agencies promoting technological advancement and agricultural productivity, and farmers 
and agro-industrial businesses attracted by the promise of the new technology.9 A further 
 
9 It may be noted that members of the biotech block do not promote modern agricultural biotechnology to the 
exclusion of other, more traditional, approaches to plant breeding. In fact, most of their work is often 
concentrated on non-GM crops. Furthermore, it should be noted that while I describe the biotech block as “pro-
GMO” I do not wish to imply that this is position taken without reservations. Members of the biotech block tend 
to support the adoption of GM crops that have been carefully tested and evaluated and found to provide 
significant benefits while posing minimal risks. 
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international dimension is added to the biotech block thanks to the efforts to promote 
agricultural biotechnology in the region that have been undertaken by, most prominently, the 
US government, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI, which is based in the Philippines), and the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA).10 
In this war of position, the biotech block faces a rival historic block that likewise has 
sought to capture the commanding heights of Southeast Asian’s rural political economy. In 
the core of the “alternative agriculture” block we find environmental and farmers’ 
movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local and international corporate 
actors (such as producers and buyers of “organic” foods), and arms of the state responsible 
for public health and environmental protection (Larsson 2015a; Vandergeest 2009). In a 
pattern not dissimilar from that of the US on the biotech side, the European Union, European 
governments, and prominent Europe-based NGOs such as Greenpeace have taken a number 
of initiatives aimed at promoting various kinds of alternative agriculture in Southeast Asia 
(including organic farming and the System of Rice Intensification).  
In Southeast Asia as elsewhere in the world, anti-GMO activism is transnational in 
form and it is frequently inspired by romantic visions of imagined harmonious rural 
communities that are threatened by, and therefore in need of protection from, modern markets 
and technologies (Bownas 2012; Brass 2000; Dayley 2014; Ewing 2013). In contrast, the 
policies supported by the biotech block are based on the belief that small-scale, resource-poor 
farmers have much to gain by accessing advanced crop technologies and by integrating into 
global markets. 
While farmers’ movements and NGOs are well represented within the alternative 
agriculture block, the same cannot be said for the biotech block. There have, however, been 
 
10 ISAAA is a not-for-profit international organization headquartered at Cornell University in Ithaca, New 
York. It is dedicated to providing small-scale, resource-poor farmers in developing countries access to crop 
biotechnology. It has been intimately involved in GM projects in both the Philippines and Thailand.  
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some efforts made at broadening the biotech alliance to incorporate representatives also of 
small-scale farmers. As part of this strategy, Philippine and Thai farmers have been invited 
on study tours abroad, to allow them to witness GM farming in person. While these efforts as 
yet fall rather short of any more serious pro-GM farmer mobilization, a few interesting 
initiatives have resulted. For example, in an appeal to Thailand’s National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC), a papaya farmer who has been active in the pro-GMO cause argued 
that the government by denying him access to GM seeds was violating his human rights and 
his freedom. In response, NHRC ruled that the ban on GM crops did not breach his human 
rights (Larsson 2015b: 8).11 This appeal to a national human rights body is noteworthy 
because it reflects an important dimension of the struggle for hegemony. Namely, that the 
two rival blocks have sought to “recruit” representatives of state agencies otherwise not 
primarily concerned with agricultural biotechnology and closely related issues, such as 
human rights commissioners and judges, who may be in a position to decisively tip the 
balance for or against GM crops.  
The second main idea is that the constitution as well as the power and influence of 
these rival blocks can be shaped by historical events – crises, scandals, etc. – that have little 
or nothing directly to do with GMOs. The European Union’s shift towards a precautionary 
approach to GM crops in the wake of the scandal surrounding “mad cow disease” in the 
1990s is a prominent example of this. This article posits the Asian financial crisis as a 
functional equivalent of mad cow disease – as an exogenous shock with varying degrees of 
impact in different contexts. What is new with this argument is, of course, not that the Asian 
financial crisis had important political and economic consequences, or that the crisis affected 
Southeast Asian countries differently. It is well known that because Thailand was more 
 
11 Lobbying by pro-GMO farmers also helped remove the cultivation of GM crops from a draft regulation 
identifying the types of projects or activities subjected to extra stringent regulatory requirements (Environmental 
Impact Assessment, Health Impact Assessment, Public Hearing, Independent Assessment). Author’s interview 
with Nipon Iamsupasit, Biotechnology Alliance Association, Bangkok, 3 September 2013. 
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severely affected by the crisis than the Philippines, it had a correspondingly greater impact on 
political and economic life (Hicken 2008; MacIntyre 2001; Hutchcroft 1999). In Thailand, 
the crisis led to the enactment of constitutional reforms, which in turn enabled the rise of 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party (Hicken 2006), and the fashioning of a new 
“developmental social contract” (Hewison 2005). Novelty lies in the link between the 
financial crisis and the divergent fates of agricultural biotechnology in the two countries. This 
analysis resonates with that of Tiberghien, who has argued that the “the GMO issue” in the 
European Union and Japan may be regarded as “a proxy” for a “larger malaise about 
globalization” (Tiberghien 2006: 15-16). In Thailand, similarly, GMOs came to be associated 
with “cleavage-ridden issues with redistributive implications like globalization, discomfort 
with Western technoscientific models, and cultural imperialism” (Durant 2007: 433). 
While the Asian financial crisis led to a wide-ranging reshaping of the political 
landscape in Thailand, but not in the Philippines, ideational changes were particularly 
important. This is because many of the political institutions that were created in Thailand in 
the wake of the financial crisis (such as the 1997 constitution) or the new political actors that 
rose to power and influence (such as Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party) have not endured. 
In contrast with institutional fluidity and a rotating cast of characters, ideational changes that 
can be traced back to the Asian financial crisis have proven remarkably durable in the years 
since. Thus, while the shorter-term political consequences of the Asian financial crisis play 
an important role in the making and unmaking of GMO-related policies, it is ideational 
change (Thailand) and continuity (the Philippines) that have locked the two countries into 
their divergent trajectories for the longer term. 
 
A brief history of policies and initiatives relevant to GM crops 
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In order to demonstrate the effect of the Asian financial crisis on the politics of GM crops it 
is necessary to describe the sequence of events that led to divergent biotech outcomes in 
Thailand and the Philippines. For analytical purposes, I will divide the presentation of the 
history of relevant biotech policies and initiatives into three periods. The first, during which 
the two countries become pioneering supporters of GM crops, begins in the early 1980s and 
ends in 1997, after the onset of the Asian financial crisis. The second period, from 1998 to 
2002, is characterized by rising opposition to GM crops that eventually causes the two 
countries to adopt contrasting approaches. During the final period, from 2003 until 2015, 
contestation over GM crops continues, but efforts to reverse policy fail – demonstrating how 
the two countries have become locked into their divergent trajectories. The section concludes 
with a comparative discussion. 
 
Biotech pioneers, 1980-1997 
Thailand 
In Thailand, a National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC) was 
established in 1983, falling under the Ministry of Science and Technology. BIOTEC in turn 
funded the establishment, in 1985, of the Plant Genetic and Engineering Unit of Kasetsart 
University. This followed Thailand’s failed bid to be selected as host of the International 
Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB), a UN institution now 
headquartered in Trieste, Italy. In addition to BIOTEC, a number of R&D-focused units were 
established within the Department of Agriculture (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), 
most notably the Biotechnology Research and Development Office.  
A relatively comprehensive regulatory framework was also quickly put into place. 
National biosafety guidelines were issued in 1992; a National Biosafety Committee was 
formed in 1993; the first field trials involving GM crops (Flavr Savr tomato) were given the 
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green light as early as 1994, making Thailand the first country in ASEAN to field-test a GM 
crop. Monsanto initiated GM cotton field trials in northern Thailand in 1997, while the 
country was struggling through the deepest depths of the Asian financial crisis. The economic 
hardship actually provided an immediate impetus for the promotion of GM cotton. As the 
country’s textile industry was heavily dependent on imports of GM cotton from the United 
States and Australia, boosting domestic cotton production would reduce the need to use 
scarce foreign currency to secure adequate supplies. But that would require new and 
improved seeds, as farmers were turning away from cotton, a crop that was being devastated 
by pests (Koetsawang 1998). Thai research and development was also initiated on a number 
of other locally important crops, such as beans, chili pepper, cotton, papaya, pineapple, and 
tomatoes. 
During much of this period, this official enthusiasm for biotech crops reflected a 
broader developmental approach that emphasized “openness,” and was centered on 
promoting exports, attracting foreign direct investment, liberalizing financial markets, and 
improving farmers’ access to finance, inputs, and markets (Bowie and Unger 1997; 
Phongpaichit and Baker 1998; Larsson 2012). The severe financial crisis that hit Thailand in 
1997, forcing the country to devalue the bah and seek a bailout from the International 
Monetary Fund, shook faith in this “globalist” developmental model, not least at the very 
highest levels of the polity. In Bangkok on 4 December 1997, the Thai monarch held his 
annual speech to the nation, where he extolled the virtues of self-sufficiency in these terms: 
“We have to live carefully and we have to go back to do things which are not complicated 
and which do not use elaborate, expensive equipment. We need to move backward in order to 
move forward” (Phongpaichit 2004: 161).  
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With this royal pronouncement, the ideational context in which the biotech block – 
arguably advocates of exceedingly complicated, elaborate, expensive, and “foreign” 
technologies – operated began to shift in an unfavorably “localist” direction  (Hewison 2000). 
 
The Philippines 
The Philippines’ claim to pioneer status when it comes to modern agricultural 
biotechnology is justified in so far as the Philippines was the first Southeast Asian nation to 
create a regulatory framework for research and development on GMOs. Its trailblazing efforts 
can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, when a biotechnology research institute 
was first established at the University of the Philippines–Los Baños. A National Biosafety 
Committee was established by presidential decree in 1990, and it issued its first biosafety 
guidelines for GMOs in 1991. However, prior to 1996 there was “virtually no genetic 
engineering work in the country” (Halos 2000). In December 1997 the government of 
President Fidel Ramos signed the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) into 
law. The formally stated objective of this act was to “modernize” the agriculture and fisheries 
sectors “in order to enhance their profitability” and “prepare [them] for the challenges of 
globalization.” The act recognized agricultural biotechnology as one important means, 
alongside a “market-driven approach,” by which to promote food security (including 
“sufficiency” in the staple foods rice and white corn), alleviate rural poverty, and make the 
agricultural sector globally competitive.15 President Fidel Ramos described the bill as one of 
“his administration’s Christmas gifts to Filipinos” (Lugo 1997). Like the Thai monarch, 
Ramos posited self-sufficiency as a central development goal. But sufficiency was conceived 
in radically different terms, namely import substitution, and integration into global markets 
and the development and adoption of cutting-edge technologies for the production of cash 
 
15 http://nafc.da.gov.ph/afma/ra8435-1.php 
 21 
crops were identified as solutions to the problem of low productivity in the agricultural 
sector. The Philippines would have to move forward in order to move forward. 
The comparatively mild impact of the Asian financial crisis in the Philippines meant 
that pressures for reform were weak and the backlash against globalization muted (MacIntyre 
2001; Hicken 2008), to the continued advantage of the biotech block. 
 
Biotech wobbles, 1998–2002 
Thailand 
Following the Asian financial crisis, and as a consequence of that crisis, sufficiency 
economy became a keystone of official Thai nationalism. The ideological shift in favor of 
“localism” as opposed to globalized capitalism, was manifested in the rhetorical embrace by 
Thai political elites of the economic philosophy that the Thai monarch, in the midst of the 
financial crisis, had offered as an antidote to the negative consequences of global capitalism: 
setthakit phophiang (เศรษฐกิจพอเพียง, sufficiency economy) (Hewison 2000; Tejapira 2002; 
Unger 2009; Walker 2010). Sufficiency economy’s applied agricultural component, referred 
to as thritsadi mai (ทฤษฎีใหม่, literally “new theory” but often translated as “new agricultural 
theory”), was imagined as providing the agrarian basis for self-sufficiency at the level of rural 
households, farming communities, and, ultimately, the Thai nation. This royal message 
resonated strongly with the discourse developed by the alternative agriculture movement that 
had emerged in Thailand in the years before the financial crisis struck (Vandergeest 2009). 
However, it was clearly discordant with the biotech block’s globalist high-tech approach to 
development. Indeed, GMOs were frequently depicted as the very antithesis of the 
sufficiency economy philosophy and new agricultural theory. As one leading Thai anti-GMO 
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campaigner and “sustainable” agriculture champion put it: “GMOs are incompatible with the 
sufficiency economy. We are trying to promote the king’s practice.”16 
This royally inspired anti-GMO rhetoric resonated powerfully with a more general 
anti-globalization discourse that won popular currency in the wake of the crisis, and which 
depicted foreign “others” as significant threats to Thai national wellbeing. In the more distant 
past, these “others” had primarily been identified with Western (French, British) imperialists 
and Asian (Chinese, Vietnamese) communists and their Thai collaborators (Larsson 2012). 
Now it was the representatives of global capitalism (and their domestic collaborators) who 
were identified as threats to national wellbeing. In the wake of the crisis, neo-nationalist 
rhetoric articulated images of “Thais as slaves to foreigners, the semi-colonialism of 
economic imperialism, and immoral foreign robber-barons” (Callahan 2003: 496). In this 
ideological environment, it was a relatively simple task for opponents of modern agricultural 
biotechnology to fit GMOs into these powerfully emotive images, with farmers cast as 
“slaves” of foreign MNCs, Monsanto in the role of the powerful foreign villain, and the semi-
colonialism of the international IPR regime as dark backdrop. 
It was in this new ideological context that the biotech cause suffered its first 
significant setback. In 1999,  controversy erupted following the apparent escape of GM 
cotton plants from Monsanto’s research fields into the hands of Thai farmers (GRAIN 2001). 
This “leak” of GM cotton was discovered by Munithi chiwawithi (มูลนิธิชีววิถี, Biodiversity and 
Community Rights Action Thailand [Biothai]), a local NGO that had been campaigning to 
halt the adoption of GM crops. It is unclear what exactly happened, but it is possible that 
small-scale rural “seed pirates” were providing farmers facing a debilitating pest problem 
with “bootlegged” GM seeds,17 well before the slow-moving regulatory apparatus had had a 
 
16 Author’s interview with Natwipha Ewasakul, Greenpeace, Bangkok, 11 September 2013. 
17 http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06BANGKOK3237.html 
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chance to catch up. The seeds, which reduced the need to use pesticides, were proving 
extremely popular among long-suffering cotton farmers.18  
In light of the ideological context of the post-crisis environment, the potency of this 
incident was significant. In the wake of the scandal, the Thai government hesitated to give the 
green light for commercialization of GM cotton, but research and development continued. 
A second major setback followed in 2001, in the wake of the landslide election 
victory of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party, who had emerged as an unlikely 
champion of localism and sufficiency economy. Indeed, Thaksin’s words and deeds played a 
key role in ensuring that one of the main legacies “of the economic crisis in Thailand may 
have been to mainstream localism, not merely as an ideological cover for ultra-nationalist 
reaction, but as an integral component of a new economic compact” (Connors 2005, 280). A 
key component of Thaksin’s electoral strategy had been to not only pay lip-service to royal 
economic discourse but also to develop links with NGO leaders, including those championing 
a localist agenda. Before taking power and also after doing so, Thaksin was highly responsive 
to the issues raised by “localists” (Connors 2005, 279). While this may have reflected pure 
political opportunism on Thaksin’s part, his political strategy was to have deleterious 
consequences for the biotech block. 
On his first day in office, on 10 January 2001, Thaksin had lunch with representatives 
of the Assembly of the Poor (AOP), a social-justice movement with roots in the country’s 
rural areas, whose dramatic rise in the late 1990s had challenged the top-down and 
globalization-centered development model adopted by successive Thai governments. While 
the AOP had initially been quite alone in their focus on redressing rural grievances relating to 
the development policies and projects of Thai governments, in the wake of the Asian 
 
18 The Thai cotton sector which had been devastated by pests suddenly bounced back as farmers gained access 
to seeds referred to as fay thewada (ฝ้ายเทวดา, cotton of angels). See Tantiwithayaphithak (2001). Today, 
however, almost nothing remains of Thai cotton cultivation. Thailand’s production of cotton lint in 2012 was 
equal to 6.1 percent of production in 1982. 
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financial crisis it became part of a wider national (and indeed international) anti-globalization 
network that in particular targeted international development institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank. AOP presented Thaksin with 
a long list of demands, mainly concerning dam projects and access to land and forests. But on 
the list was also a demand for the “suspension of field trials of GM crops,” an issue that had 
been championed by one of the AOP’s component groups, the Alternative Agriculture 
Network (Missingham 2003: 210).19 The Thaksin government moved quickly to address all 
of these grievances in order to put an end to AOP’s protest encampment, which under 
previous governments had become an almost permanent fixture – and a political 
embarrassment – in front of Government House. A cabinet resolution on 3 April 2001 
addressed the vast majority of AOP’s demands. The resolution also included a declaration 
that GM field trials would be suspended, and a promise that a biosafety law would be drafted 
by a panel comprised of representatives of AOP, consumer organizations, state agencies, and 
environmental and public health experts (Secretariat of the Cabinet 2001). It was expected 
that the draft would be ready before the end of the year, and that field trials would then 
resume under the new law (Bangkok Post 2001a). The part of the cabinet resolution relating 
to field trials was brief – one sentence – and somewhat ambiguous, but it subsequently 
emerged that the DOA halted open field trials of GM crops but not closed field trials. 
Thus, the suspension of open field trials in 2001 was one very minor component of a 
larger “package deal” struck between the Thaksin government and AOP. The government’s 
concessions to these demands must be understood in light of the political situation in which 
Thaksin found himself at the time. Although his party had won a decisive electoral victory, 
Thaksin personally was in a legally precarious position as he had been charged with 
concealing assets earlier in his political career. Yielding to the AOP’s demands was one way 
 
19 The Alternative Agriculture Network represented about 2,000 “farming families nationwide” (Missingham 
2003: 48). 
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to further bolster his political support base (Bangkok Post 2001b). It also strengthened the 
Thaksin government’s credentials as a champion of the king’s sufficiency economy – the 
economic philosophy which Thaksin in October 2001 made the guiding principle of 
development in the 9th National and Economic Social Development Plan (2002-06). 
 
The Philippines 
Following the enactment of the agricultural modernization bill, the Philippine government 
launched GM research projects on banana, coconut, maize, mango, and papaya (la Cruz 
2002: 107-8), and leading US agro-industrial corporations completed field trials on a type of 
GM maize that contain a gene from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (and hence often 
referred to as Bt corn), which makes the plant resistant to lepidopteran insects. 
Not everyone in Philippine society was equally sanguine about the government’s pro-
GMO approach to agricultural modernization, however. In 1999, a senator put forth a bill that 
would ban the release of GMOs, but which failed to get out of committee, and anti-GMO 
NGOs such as the alternative-agriculture network MASIPAG (a seed-exchange group) 
successfully lobbied a few local governments to pass resolutions against field testing of 
GMOs in their area (de Lange and Castillo 1999).  
In early 2001, it looked as if the anti-GMO movement might have succeeded in 
capturing one of the Philippine political system’s commanding heights: the presidency. Only 
weeks after her inauguration in January 2001 – following the toppling of President Joseph 
Estrada by a second “people power” movement (Landé 2001) – President Macapagal-Arroyo 
to the great satisfaction of anti-GMO activists declared that the Philippines would now 
abandon the biotech push that had been pursued by her recent predecessors: “There is great 
objection to this from the civil society. So the Philippines will not be initiating or pushing for 
this experimentation” (Agence France-Presse 2001; Baconguis 2001). By jumping off the 
 26 
GMO juggernaut, Macapagal-Arroyo was clearly seeking to please some of the more 
stridently anti-GMO groups that had helped her topple Estrada and paved the way for her 
constitutionally dubious elevation, by the Supreme Court, from the vice-presidency to the 
presidency (Franco 2004). 
Her stand against GMOs would not endure. With agribusiness interests on Mindanao 
as some of the most vocal, pro-GMO advocates responded quickly and urged the president to 
reconsider the indicated policy U-turn on agricultural biotechnology (Castillo and Fiel 2001; 
BusinessWorld 2001). Similar views were soon put forward by a number of august 
institutions and personalities, notably the National Academy of Science and Technology and 
the former chairman of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Bishop 
Jesus Varela (Castillo 2001; Moises 2001). With the backlash growing in business and 
science circles, combined with a strong pushback from within her own cabinet, the president 
found it wise to reverse her GMO rethink. On 16 July 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo 
issued the Philippine National Policy Statement on Modern Biotechnology, which committed 
her government to the promotion of  “the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology 
and its products” in order to, among other things, “achieve and maintain food security” and 
“provide farmers and fisherfolks the opportunity to increase their over-all productivity and 
income.”20 The status quo ante had been restored. 
More radical anti-GMO manifestations would ensue, but did not seriously threaten the 
government’s commitment to biotechnology. In late August 2001, for example, several 
hundred protesters led by KMP attacked one of Monsanto’s sites for field testing and 
uprooted the vilified GM plants (Oliver 2001). In 2002, however, the Department of 
Agriculture issued an administrative order “which provided the basis for commercial release 
 
20 http://www.ncbp.dost.gov.ph/19-guidelines/28-philippine-national-policy-statement-on-modern-
biotechnology 
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of biotech crops” (Torres et al. 2012: 4), and in December of that year commercial cultivation 
of GM maize – in the form of Monsanto’s MON810 variety – was approved.21 
 
Off/on the biotech train, 2003-15 
Thailand 
While the Thai economy had recovered from the depths of the financial crisis under Thaksin, 
and the debts to the IMF paid back in full ahead of schedule in 2003, the ideological counter-
reaction to globalization continued. And while the origins of Thai anti-GMO activism may be 
found in civil society, it was increasingly becoming a state-backed project. 
One of the manifestations of this was that opponents of agricultural biotechnology 
were increasingly able to draw on material support for their anti-GMO cause from a number 
of more independent and politically autonomous Thai state agencies, many of which were 
established following the enactment of the 1997 constitution. Biothai, the country’s leading 
anti-GMO campaigner, has since 2002 received the majority of its funding from such 
agencies, most notably the Thai Health Promotion Fund, the Thai Research Fund, and the 
National Human Rights Commission. In contrast, the members of Thailand’s biotech block, 
in the wake of the crisis, found it difficult to adapt to the shifting discursive sands. 
Proponents of GM crops largely refrained from even attempting to link modern agricultural 
technology to sufficiency economy and its promise of national salvation. 
Thailand’s stalled biotech push nevertheless gained renewed momentum in 2003, with 
the cabinet approving a five-year biotech master plan. The plan included a government 
commitment to “set forth clear policy or management to settle some highly controversial 
issues” such as “policy on the development of safe GMO products” (National Science and 
Technology Development Agency 2005: 4). The plan included on its “immediate” to-do list 
 
21 Just to be clear: this type of GM maize is for feed and not for food; it is different from the white corn 
mentioned in AFMA. 
 28 
the development of “a clear policy on genetic engineering, genetically modified organisms 
and transgenics for Thailand” (National Science and Technology Development Agency 2005: 
8). The policy did of course pay lip service to self-sufficiency ideology, but the main thrust, 
as far as agriculture was concerned, was to use modern agricultural biotechnology to enhance 
competitiveness and productivity, in support of Thaksin’s strategy of positioning Thailand in 
the global marketplace as “kitchen of the world.” A related goal was to cultivate a home-
grown biotech-intensive seed industry, allowing Thailand to emerge as a “main player” 
producing and developing new varieties for exports (National Science and Technology 
Development Agency 2005: 7). It was far from clear how this modernist and globalist biotech 
push conformed, philosophically and practically, with the government’s simultaneous 
commitment to sufficiency economy and new theory agriculture. This failure to “frame” 
biotechnology in ways that resonated with the neo-nationalist worldview would have serious 
consequences, as the renewed activity of the biotech block triggered a counter-movement. 
In the course of 2004, the biotech block suffered a number of important setbacks. In 
June, anti-GMO activists won a powerful new ally in Santi Asoke, an ascetic Buddhist sect, 
which declared its intention to oppose any attempt to introduce GM crops to Thailand, with 
the group’s charismatic leader, Phothirak, arguing that GM seeds were “not organic, not 
natural” (The Nation 2004). The declaration was made at a roundtable meeting at which 
Greenpeace, academics, and a former environment minister in Thaksin’s government joined 
Phothirak in making the case against genetically engineered seeds (Santimatanedol 2004). 
This was politically significant not least because of Thaksin’s strong historical links to the 
unorthodox religious movement and its defunct political arm, the Palang Dharma Party, 
which Thaksin had helmed from 1995 to 1996. After Thaksin came to power, Santi Asoke 
benefited greatly from this association, as the government turned to it to help educate debt-
ridden farmers in “organic farming, recycling and reusing.” By 2004, Santi Asoke had for 
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several years been hired by the Thaksin government to preach the gospel of organic farming 
to tens of thousands of poor farmers, while subjecting them to “sermons on the virtues of 
vegetarianism” and Buddhist economics (Heikkilä-Horn 2010: 35).22 
On 27 July, in what arguably became the “doomsday for agricultural biotechnology in 
Thailand,” Greenpeace attacked and destroyed papaya plants growing in confined field trials 
at DOA’s Khon Kaen Agricultural Research station (Davidson 2008: 487). Greenpeace also 
claimed that GM papaya seeds had been distributed to farmers by the DOA – a charge that 
was later substantiated. Following this incident, the Thaksin government put a moratorium 
also on confined field trials of GM crops. 
In spite of these setbacks, the biotech block already in August 2004 made a bold 
attempt to push through a liberalization of the regulatory regime, in line with the 
biotechnology plan that had been unveiled the previous year. Thaksin, as chairman of the 
National Biotechnology Policy Committee, declared that the government would now back 
research, development, and commercialization of GM crops in order to ensure that the 
country would not “miss the biotechnology train.” Representatives of the biotech block – in 
government, science, and business – expressed great satisfaction with the pronouncement 
(Samabuddhi 2004). But their happiness would be short-lived. Opponents of GMOs quickly 
mobilized, and pointed to the papaya debacle as one good reason for not pushing forward 
with GM crops. More importantly, critics feared that Thailand would become dominated by 
US-based seed companies, and that the country’s “self-sufficient economy” would be hurt 
(Sirisunthorn 2004). 
Such fears of neocolonialism had been exacerbated by the fact that the GM issue had 
become intimately intertwined with efforts, initiated during President George W Bush’s visit 
to Thailand in October 2003, to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with the 
 
22 Santi Asoke eventually turned on Thaksin, with its “Dharma Army” taking the lead in demonstrations that 
paved the way for the 2006 military coup.   
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United States. This was just the latest of several FTA initiatives embraced by the TRT 
government, and they had all proved deeply unpopular among those segments of Thai society 
most disillusioned with “globalization.” A number of civil society groups now rallied in 
opposition to what they saw as an effort by the United States and allied Thai business elites – 
with Thaksin at the helm – to “colonize” Thailand, scupper the development of a genuine 
sufficiency economy, and run roughshod over the 1997 constitution (see Free Thai Statement 
in C. C. Bamford and Bamford 2005: 15-17). For anti-FTA activists, GMOs came to be seen 
as the thin edge of the American free-trade wedge. As a consequence, social mobilization 
against the US-Thai FTA negotiations provided anti-GM activists with a golden opportunity 
to link their rather narrow cause to a much broader coalition of social movements. Indeed, 
Biothai came to serve as the central node – the secretariat – in the network of NGOs and 
social movements that in October 2003 established the anti-free trade organization, FTA 
Watch.23 United in their opposition to free trade, global capitalism, Thaksin, and GMOs, they 
were able to mobilize significant political pressure against the idea that Thailand ought to 
catch any biotech trains anytime soon. This was strikingly similar to what had happened 
when GMOs became part of the AOP agenda in 2001, and it was to have similar 
consequences. 
In response to the instant backlash from activist groups, Thaksin’s cabinet hesitated 
and, instead of backing up the prime minister’s endorsement of GMOs, once again kicked the 
issue into the long grass, promising to further study the pros and cons of GMOs while 
enabling regulations as well as the long-awaited biosafety law were being drafted. Thaksin 
assured his anti-GMO critics that there was “no way” that he would “let the country be 
colonized” (“ไม่มีทางไปยอมเป็นเมืองขึ้น”) (Phuchatkan raiwan 2004). 
 
23 http://www.ftawatch.org 
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 While the Thai royal family has general avoided direct engagement in the GMO 
controversy, Princess Sirindhorn in 2005 echoed a by now well-established nationalist 
discourse by speaking out against genetic engineering of rice, and against the adoption of GM 
seeds for which foreigners hold the intellectual property rights, as doing so would, she 
suggested, force “Thai farmers to depend on foreigners” (จะทําให้เกษตรกรไทยต้องพึ่งพาต่างชาติ).24 
Following Thaksin’s failure to push through a GM-crop policy aligned with the 
dreams of the biotech block in 2004, the anti-globalization movement became part of a 
broader political coalition which mobilized against continued TRT rule, smoothing the path 
for the military coup that ousted him from power in September 2006. The anti-Thaksin 
movement brought together members of royalist networks, sections of Thai capital excluded 
from political patronage, the Bangkok middle class, and a wide spectrum of social 
movements and NGOs, including Santi Asoke’s “Dharma Army.” Pye and Schaffar view the 
grassroots support for the anti-Thaksin movement that took to the streets in March 2006 as a 
result of the “inherent contradictions” within Thaksin’s “‘post-neoliberal’ capitalist 
restructuring project,” which combined populist policies appealing to the rural population 
with policies primarily designed to serve “the interests of large Thai corporations looking for 
competitiveness in the global market,” including major agribusinesses like Charoen 
Pokphand (CP) (Pye and Schaffar 2008: 39 44 48). Such inherent contradictions abounded 
also in relation to GM crops, as can be seen in the TRT-led government’s simultaneous 
commitment to, on the one hand, the AOP agenda and sufficiency economy ideology, and, on 
the other hand, modern biotechnology as key to the future competitiveness of Thai 
agriculture. 
 
24 The comment, which was made at the “Sustainable Agriculture Exhibition” at Kasetsat University on the 
theme of “recovery of the independent way of life for national sovereignty,” has provided anti-GMO activist 
with royal ammunition (Biothai 2007). 
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These contradictions were not resolved by the 2006 coup, nor have they been resolved 
since. While sufficiency economy had been enshrined as the national model of development 
in the 2007 constitution, in December 2007 the cabinet led by Privy Councilor Surayut 
Chulanond nevertheless lifted the 2001 moratorium on field trials, declaring that it would 
now be possible to conduct certain types of limited field trials subject to an onerous 
application procedure with cabinet approval as the final hurdle. Shortly thereafter the cabinet 
also approved the draft National Biosafety Act and submitted it to the Council of State for 
further legal review. Once the country returned to parliamentary government in 2008, 
however, no meaningful progress was made on either of these fronts. 
The May 2014 military coup and the installation of a new military-dominated cabinet 
gave renewed hope to members of the biotech block: “If this government can’t say yes to 
[GMO] field trials, then it will never ever happen.”25 Although early signs that the junta 
might be willing to consider moving forward on GM crops were met with opposition from 
members of the alternative agriculture block, the ruling junta, led by Prime Minister Prayut 
Chan-ocha, in November 2015 approved the long-delayed draft of the biosafety law – the 
“GMO act” to its critics – and submitted it to the legislature. In response, Biothai accused the 
military regime of paving the way for the “colonization” of Thai agriculture by multinational 
corporations,26 and it coordinated anti-GMO demonstrations across the country (remarkable 
given that all political manifestations had been banned by the military) (Sankham 2015). In 
face of these protests, General Prayut performed yet another policy U-turn and returned the 
biosafety bill to the legislative deep freezer – effectively killing any hope the biotech block 
may have had that the military dictatorship would prove able to get the biotech train back on 
track (Jikkham, Jitcharoenkul, and Wipatayotin 2015). 
 
25 Author’s interview with Darunee Edwards, President of the Food Science and Technology Association of 
Thailand, Bangkok, 25 September 2014. 
26 http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2015/11/62616 
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As was the case for Thaksin, moves toward a resurrection of Thailand’s agricultural 
biotech ambitions made by military-dominated governments conflicted with their 
simultaneous commitment to the royalist ideology of sufficiency economy. As one indication 
of the support that the anti-GMO movement could count on also from within authoritarian 
Thai governments, one may consider a recent article entitled “The sufficiency economy 
philosophy and globalization,” written by cabinet secretary Ampon Kittiampon, who is one 
of the country’s top technocrats. In the article, he presents genetic engineering as inherently 
incompatible with the ideology and ethics of sufficiency-economy philosophy, and explains 
that Thailand has rejected GM crops because the technology would “undermine the rights of 
Thai farmers … and damage the foundations of our agriculture” (Kittiampon 2014: 13). 
 
 
 
The Philippines 
While anti-globalization ideas similar to those articulated in Thailand in this period can be 
found in abundance in political discussions also in the Philippines – including in the two 
houses of parliament – they did no capture the national imagination to the same extent as in 
Thailand. Because the Philippines was less hard hit by the crisis, anti-GMO activists there 
have been unable to link their single-issue campaign to a more broad-based societal counter-
reaction against globalization. Simply put, whereas many Thais lost faith in globalization, 
Filipinos have to a markedly greater extent remained steadfast.35 As a consequence, the 
alternative agriculture block remained a more marginal political force in the Philippines, and 
 
35 For example, the AsiaBarometer survey of 2004 revealed that Thais are significantly less trusting of foreign 
MNCs than Filipinos. In Thailand, 57.7 percent of respondents said they trusted foreign MNCs “a lot” or “to a 
degree” “to operate in the best interests of society.” In the Philippines, the equivalent number was 72.6 percent. 
See AsiaBarometer 2004 Q26, available at 
https://www.asiabarometer.org/en/findings/General%20findings/2004/Q26.  
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the biotech block has been able, to a much greater extent than in Thailand, to set the political 
agenda with regards to agricultural development strategies. 
In early 2003, Philippine farmers began planting GM maize. In April 2003, a last 
ditch effort was made to derail the biotech train, with representatives of environmental and 
farmers groups (including Greenpeace, the Ecological Society of the Philippines, and the 
Philippine Greens) launching a hunger strike against GM crops in front of the Department of 
Agriculture’s offices in Quezon City (Gonzales 2003). The CBCP gave its moral support to 
the activists on hunger strike, and weighed in by asking the government to postpone the 
introduction of GM maize (Manila Bulletin 2003a; Manila Bulletin 2003b). This was rather 
too little too late: the hunger strike initiative was taken well after Monsanto had already 
distributed GM seeds to farmers for their first biotech crop. While the last remaining hunger 
striker gave up after one month without having won any concessions from the national 
government, the hunger strikers and their supporters did succeed in raising awareness about 
GMOs, and they inspired continued lobbying efforts that were to pay off in the form of local 
government decrees declaring sub-national areas “GMO free.” A prominent example is the 
2003 ordinance issued by the Bohol provincial government, prohibiting “the entry, use, and 
propagation of GMOs in the province to safeguard the health of Boholanos and protect the 
environment” (Pamugas 2011: 443). Similar “GMO-free zones” were subsequently 
established in Negros Occidental, Oriental Mindoro, and several other parts of the 
archipelago. 
Following the introduction of GM maize, Philippine governments have continued to 
provide political support for the development and adoption of advanced biotechnology in the 
agricultural sector. Significant public-sector funds have been allocated to research and 
development of GM rice, sweet potato, papaya, eggplant, tomato, and abaca. As a 
consequence, the Philippines is building up a pipeline of GM crops that may, in due course, 
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be commercialized. Thus, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the Philippines witnesses 
a continuing and gradually deepening political commitment to modern agricultural 
biotechnology, cementing its position as a Southeast Asian agro-scientific hub.  
In 2007, President Macapagal-Arroyo deepened her political commitment to 
biotechnology by declaring that the last week of November would henceforth be “National 
Biotechnology Week,” which has become an important occasion for a high-profile 
celebration of advances in the development of home-grown, indigenous “Pinoy biotech.”36 
While the Philippines has continued to celebrate Pinoy biotech also under Macapagal-
Arroyo’s successor, President Benigno S Aquino, the new president nevertheless appeared 
more hesitant with regards to the country’s adopted biotech policy. This was indicated not 
least by the appointment of Proceso Alcala, a champion of organic farming, as Secretary of 
Agriculture from the start of his administration in 2010. In fact, it was only in late 2013 that 
President Aquino made a public statement of support for the application of modern 
agricultural biotechnology in order “to feed our people and strengthen our national economy” 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer 2013). This critical presidential intervention followed a number of 
high-profile setbacks for the bioteck block. 
Following an appeal by, among others, Greenpeace Southeast Asia and MASIPAG, 
the Court of Appeals in Manila in May 2013 decided that field trials of GM eggplant 
(growing what is locally known as Bt talong) had to stop,37 and in August anti-GMO activists 
attacked and destroyed GM field trials of so-called Golden Rice at a governmental 
agricultural research station in Bicol province (McGrath 2013; Fernandez 2011). In light of 
these controversies, it was politically highly significant that the biotech could demonstrate at 
 
36 http://nbw.dost.gov.ph. Pinoy biotech includes but is not limited to GM crops. 
37 In February 2011, members of Greenpeace had “decontaminated” this GM eggplant field trial at the 
University of the Philippines–Los  Baños. 
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this juncture that it retained the backing of one of the commanding heights of the Philippine 
political system – the Presidency. 
Although the court decision in effect was moot, as the trials had already been 
completed by the time the court reached its decision, the ruling raised the specter of further 
court cases that might stop ongoing and future field trials. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the court 
decision was greeted with “elation” by environmental activists (Estremera 2013), but met 
with dismay among many in the scientific community (MST Business 2013). The Joint 
Foreign Chambers of Commerce of the Philippines questioned the ruling, declaring it “a 
major setback to the advancement of Philippine research and development, particularly 
modern biotechnology, which is critical in addressing the issues of hunger, better nutrition 
and access to food in the country” (Joint Foreign Chambers of the Philippines 2013). The 
respondents in the case – including the Department of Agriculture, University of the 
Philippines-Los Baños, and ISAAA – appealed the case to the Supreme Court, and pro-GMO 
farmers sought to signal to the Philippine courts that there is widespread popular support for 
Bt talong (Requejo 2014; Philippine News Agency 2013).  
While the biotech block in the Philippines triumphed in the years following the Asian 
financial crisis, the opponents of agricultural biotechnology have been successful in one 
respect. They have delayed the introduction of additional GM crops, and it remains to be seen 
whether GM maize proves to be the first of many similar crops, or whether it, for the 
foreseeable future, will remain the singular Philippine representative of the gene revolution.39  
Indeed, the sustainability of the Philippine incorporation of GM crops into its model 
of national development is in more serious doubt now than at any other point in recent 
history. In December 2015, the Supreme Court decided not only to uphold the verdict of the 
 
39 The politics of GM eggplant and Golden Rice in the Philippines is different from that of GM maize in at 
least two respects. First, GM maize is for animal feed, whereas eggplants and rice are for human consumption. 
Secondly, GM maize could be framed in relation to “sufficiency” (meaning import substitution), but that is not 
possible for these new crops. The primary justifications are that GM eggplant will reduce the need for heavy use 
of pesticides, and that Golden Rice will provide nutritional benefits (addressing Vitamin A deficiency). 
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Court of Appeals, but also declared the Administrative Order regulating the “importation and 
release into the environment of plants and plant products derived from the use of modern 
biotechnology,” originally issued in 2002, null and void. In so doing, the court banned further 
development, testing, commercialization, and importation of GM crops (Interaksyon.com 
2015). While this ban was described as temporary, awaiting the passing of a new and 
improved administrative order, it remains to be seen if the court’s decision will merely slow 
down the biotech train – or completely derail it, as some hoped and others feared 
(Purugganan 2015). 
Conclusion 
This article represents a first attempt to explain variation in the extent to which 
Southeast Asian countries have adopted GM crops. It has argued that the striking policy 
divergence between Thailand and the Philippines since 2001 cannot easily be accounted for 
by reference to cultural constants, material interests, or political institutions. Instead it has 
sought to demonstrate that although the Asian financial crisis in historical terms constitutes 
but a brief episode that had nothing directly to do with agricultural biotechnology, or indeed 
with rural development, it nevertheless has had unexpected long-term consequences for the 
politics of GM crops. The divergence between the Philippines and Thailand with regards to 
the adoption of GMOs in agriculture can be explained, at least in part, by significant 
differences in the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the political environment in which 
the rival historic blocks operated. 
The parallel histories of biotech policy have established that both Thailand and the 
Philippines were exploring the opportunities presented by agricultural biotechnology in 
similar ways in the years leading up to the Asian financial crisis. They have also shown that, 
in the aftermath of the crisis, 2001 was a pivotal year. It appeared then, for a few months, as 
if the alternative agriculture block was triumphing over the pro-biotech forces in both 
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Thailand and the Philippines, as politically victorious but simultaneously vulnerable new 
leaders – Thaksin and Macapagal-Arroyo – found it politically expedient, in the short term, to 
give in to demands from opponents of GM crops. A great deal of contingency was involved 
in these episodes and it would be to overstate the case that everything that transpired can be 
traced back to the Asian financial crisis and its consequences. It is nevertheless striking that, 
in the Philippines, Macapagal-Arroyo’s announcement that she would stop further work on 
GM crops was quickly and easily reversed. In Thailand, by contrast, Thaksin’s concessions 
have proven politically impossible to reverse, despite serious efforts to revive Thai ambitions 
for GM crops in 2004 and then in the wake of the 2006 and 2014 military coups. These 
differences in the “stickiness” of decisions that threaten the biotech block’s policy agenda can 
be attributed to important differences in the ideological context that were induced by the 
Asian financial crisis, and which in turn weakened the biotech block relative to the alternative 
agriculture block in Thailand, but not in the Philippines. 
The article does not mean to suggest that the impact of the Asian financial crisis can 
explain variation in policies relating to GM crops elsewhere in the region. It does propose 
that the fate of modern agricultural biotechnology hinges, in no small part, on the ability of 
the biotech block and its opponents to frame the new technology and its fruits in ways that 
resonate with dominant economic-nationalist narratives and ideologies of development. 
It also suggests that while it is easy to imagine that states control the tickets to the 
biotech train,41 this is only partly true. At the level of official policy, it is of course true that 
farmers have very little influence over what decisions are made with regard to regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology. Such policy choices predominantly involve political, economic, 
scientific, and judicial elites. But in the face of grassroots resistance it may prove exceedingly 
difficult to enforce such regulations, particularly if official policy runs against the grain of the 
 
41 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this turn of phrase. 
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perceived self-interests of small-scale farmers. The emergence of an underground economy 
of GM seeds in Thailand serves as a reminder of the Thai state’s inability to translate its 
ideological commitment to a particular interpretation of sufficiency economy into facts on the 
ground. Although GM-friendly Thai farmers have not engaged in any more serious form of 
collective action aimed at effecting policy change, individually, and in a “weapon of the 
weak” kind of way (Scott 1985), they have nevertheless challenged the hegemony of 
sufficiency-economy ideology. In line with the frequently-observed pragmatic and playful 
experimental orientation of Thai farmers when it comes to crop choices and farming 
techniques (Walker 2009: 76; Dayley 2011: 354), some have, as noted earlier, adopted GM 
crops in spite of the official ban.42 A survey conducted in 2010 by anti-GMO activists and 
academics found that several GM crops were being grown on Thai farms, including maize, 
soy beans, papaya, chili pepper, and cotton (Thai News Service 2010). A more recent survey 
found evidence that GM papaya and cotton were being illicitly cultivated (Sarnsamak 
2012).43 Such DIY biotechnology can be understood as a non-confrontational form of 
resistance to sufficiency-economy ideology; a “weapon of the weak” deployed against a 
conservative state apparatus that stands in the way of biotechnological innovation that 
contradicts its nostalgic vision of “natural” farming and “self-sufficient” farmers.46   
In a similar vein but on an even greater scale it may prove difficult for the Philippine 
state to enforce a ban – which will be necessary should the recent Supreme Court decision 
stand – on GM maize, thereby criminalizing the seed choices of several hundred thousand 
Philippine farmers who have come to regard non-GM varieties as substandard. 
 
42 This experimental lust perhaps also explains, in part, why GM seeds seem to have a tendency to “leak” 
from field trial sites and laboratories to farmers’ fields in Thailand.  
43 While it is widely believed that such cultivation of GM crops would be illegal, the mercurial chairman of 
the National Biosafety Committee in an interview suggested that it may, in fact, be legal to grow some GM 
crops in Thailand – provided they could be traced back to seeds and plants brought in before the 1999 
amendment to the Plant Quarantine Act, which prohibited the importation and cultivation of genetically 
engineered plants. This would apply to some GM varieties of cotton, maize, papaya, chilli, and tomato (Pinkaew 
2004). 
46 In contrast with Scott’s Malaysian farmers who were using “everyday forms of peasant resistance” against 
agricultural modernization (Scott 1985). 
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